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<title>Andromeda Logs</title>
<link>https://andromeda.observer/</link>
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<description>Public incidents and advisories. Read at source. Root cause as published. Losses as sourced, attributed.</description>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<item><title>TENDRIL Tax Token: Burn-and-Sync Sell Hook Drained the USDT Pool</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/tendril-tax-token-burn-sync-pool-drain</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/tendril-tax-token-burn-sync-pool-drain</guid><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>TENDRIL's sell-tax hook burned the pair's balance and synced reserves mid-sell; a flash-loaned swap took near all USDT. ~$555K pool loss, per CertiK. Primary sources: https://x.com/Phalcon_xyz/status/2118307638274675165 · https://x.com/Phalcon_xyz/status/2118335898018308197 · https://x.com/CertiKAlert/status/2118242639212658985 · https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2118229071972684057 · https://bscscan.com/tx/0xfdff4fba4327821c204af07944076ecaaee163a994398fdf4063d08712e40059</description></item><item><title>CoreVault (BNIX/OSK): Spot-Price Oracle Inflated BNB Redemption ~33-Fold</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/corevault-bnix-osk-spot-price-redemption</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/corevault-bnix-osk-spot-price-redemption</guid><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Oracle</category><description>Per Defimon and CertiK, a flash-loaned WBNB dump skewed CoreVault's spot-price oracle and inflated a principal redemption, draining its InsurancePool. Primary sources: https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2117840075291513155 · https://x.com/CertiKAlert/status/2117807437357183374 · https://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2117794176079376390 · https://bscscan.com/tx/0x072a10a579e2a8afa26a681205a2aaaa38f74bcb9d1064b12bd9e9ebe2c598b3</description></item><item><title>Binance Initial Findings: Fake Interview to Wallet Signing Service</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/binance-initial-findings-fake-interview-signing-service</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/binance-initial-findings-fake-interview-signing-service</guid><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange post-mortem (initial)</category><category>Social engineering</category><description>Binance: a fake-interview repo, an internal AI tool and a deployment token reached its wallet signing service. ~$6.34B impacted, ~$2.85B frozen. Primary sources: https://x.com/binance/status/2117626126214504729 · https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/alerts/2026/north-korea-responsible-for-6-billion-binance-attack · http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/detail/873496f71f6ab3e667a4271b5a4cf4c6 · http://kcna.kp/en/article/detail/547d4372853b197db4d1c73810d70768</description></item><item><title>Mercado Bitcoin: Security Incident, Platform Paused, US$36.3M Affected</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/mercado-bitcoin-security-incident-platform-paused</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/mercado-bitcoin-security-incident-platform-paused</guid><pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange security incident (developing)</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Mercado Bitcoin says a 2 Nov security incident affected assets worth US$36.3M; US$12.9M blocked. Platform paused; MB says it will cover balances. Primary sources: https://x.com/MercadoBitcoin/status/2117637227551273267 · https://x.com/MercadoBitcoin/status/2118096165430550882</description></item><item><title>BTCPay Server 2.4.1 and Earlier: Hot Wallets Drained</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/btcpay-server-2-4-1-hot-wallet-drains</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/btcpay-server-2-4-1-hot-wallet-drains</guid><pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Self-hosted software exploit</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>BTCPay Server says attackers drained BTC and LTC hot wallets on servers running 2.4.1 or earlier, via the flaw fixed in 2.4.2. Rebuild, don't just update. Primary sources: https://blog.btcpayserver.org/btcpay-server-security-incident-2-4-1-and-earlier/ · https://x.com/BtcpayServer/status/2117106238123123008 · https://x.com/BtcpayServer/status/2117264826569211992 · https://mempool.space/address/bc1p0f7wmcnesrapznymf9ljdn04pudgmh96sqtrm9vmgqxdh666fh8qvn63r7</description></item><item><title>Premia Vaults on Arbitrum: Empty Option Pools Locked, Then Withdrew Collateral</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/premia-arbitrum-vaults-empty-option-pools</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/premia-arbitrum-vaults-empty-option-pools</guid><pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit (developing)</category><category>Validation</category><description>Per Blockaid, an attacker created empty Premia option pools, flash-loaned and bought options to lock vault collateral, then withdrew it. ~$400K to $465K. Primary sources: https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2116745378674463229 · https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2116745382231515416 · https://x.com/PeckShieldAlert/status/2116758393067340132 · https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac</description></item><item><title>Flap and Kintsu: DNS Hijacks Sent Visitors to Malicious Clones</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/flap-kintsu-dns-hijack-malicious-clones</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/flap-kintsu-dns-hijack-malicious-clones</guid><pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DNS hijack (developing)</category><category>Third-party access</category><description>Flap and Kintsu say their domains were hijacked on 31 Oct. Kintsu: an unauthorized nameserver change at its registrar served a malicious clone for ~4 hours. Primary sources: https://x.com/Kintsu/status/2116570830075474018 · https://x.com/flapdotsh/status/2116352828734050339 · https://x.com/flapdotsh/status/2116400008127996252 · https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2116354922128015441</description></item><item><title>Troves: Legacy Rebalancer Kept Permissions, ~8.6 BTC Lost From xWBTC Vault</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/troves-legacy-rebalancer-xwbtc-vault</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/troves-legacy-rebalancer-xwbtc-vault</guid><pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit (developing)</category><category>Access control</category><description>Troves says a replaced rebalancing contract still held permissions and was used to take ~8.6 BTC from its xWBTC/WBTC vault on Starknet. Three vaults paused. Primary sources: https://x.com/trovesfi/status/2116541963755475375 · https://x.com/trovesfi/status/2116579889986068900 · https://x.com/trovesfi/status/2116606204680249415</description></item><item><title>b14g: ~97M Staked CORE Withdrawn; Core Hard Fork Recovers 68.15M</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/b14g-core-staking-unauthorized-withdrawal-hard-fork</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/b14g-core-staking-unauthorized-withdrawal-hard-fork</guid><pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Staking protocol exploit (developing)</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>b14g says ~97M CORE staked through it was withdrawn without authorization on 31 Oct. A Core hard fork on 2 Nov moved 68.15M CORE to a recovery address. Primary sources: https://x.com/b14g_network/status/2116570456245596580 · https://x.com/Coredao_Org/status/2116582149101121618 · https://x.com/b14g_network/status/2117155664980251068</description></item><item><title>Trezor: Implant Reported in a Safe 5 Sold by CryptoBilis</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/trezor-cryptobilis-implant-report</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/trezor-cryptobilis-implant-report</guid><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Hardware supply chain (unverified report)</category><category>Supply chain</category><description>Trezor says it received a credible report of a hardware implant in a Trezor Safe 5 bought from CryptoBilis. Not yet lab-verified. No losses reported. Primary sources: https://trezor.io/blog/news/implant-reported-in-a-trezor-sold-by-cryptobilis · https://x.com/Trezor/status/2116062963752747040</description></item><item><title>Binance Hot Wallets: EIP-7702 Delegation Swept Binance-Labeled Wallets on Ethereum</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/binance-hot-wallet-eip7702-sweep</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/binance-hot-wallet-eip7702-sweep</guid><pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange hot wallet compromise (developing)</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Binance estimates ~$6.3B impact and ~$3B frozen. On Ethereum, ~$3.79B left Binance-labeled wallets after an EIP-7702 delegation. Per Binance, on-chain. Primary sources: https://www.binance.com/en/support/announcement/detail/c5a8729a97ac486d963784d96c5642d7 · https://x.com/binance/status/2115993361517891592 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0xad99264d5532ae0dd04b2004eebda05f25657e70dacb764f7ac8d4ccd051298b · https://etherscan.io/tx/0x53bd38b816c23e74134786c29a8c18d792777998a3b9326047b583100e88e2f3 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7baba482077843514d9c72bac0110ba0916b0814288a72917e2c3bb27a9d8659 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc954c86f118e8e410e6a3eb9e3b38ff4a95fbdae9d2d58e13166afb7a1f4fc5f</description></item><item><title>zkLink Nova: Stale Arbitrator Auth Hash Let a Forged Batch Root Drain the L1 Bridge</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/zklink-nova-arbitrator-forged-batch-root</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/zklink-nova-arbitrator-forged-batch-root</guid><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Bridge exploit (developing)</category><category>Bridge &amp; cross-chain</category><description>zkLink Nova's Ethereum bridge lost ~$780K–805K after a stale Arbitrator auth hash let an attacker install a forged batch root. Per SlowMist, Phalcon. Primary sources: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2115635114638250409 · https://x.com/Phalcon_xyz/status/2115671779717083260 · https://x.com/zkLink_Official/status/2115731883313254565 · https://x.com/zkLink_Official/status/2115792847098216545 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4f3c23e75b9134e8cae5a462550daad42fbbc19242567fcc34c0a035e297462c</description></item><item><title>Humanode EVM: DELEGATECALL Into Stateful Precompiles Spent Existing Approvals</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/humanode-evm-precompile-delegatecall</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/humanode-evm-precompile-delegatecall</guid><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Chain-level exploit</category><category>Access control</category><description>Humanode says a DELEGATECALL flaw in its EVM precompiles let an attacker spend existing approvals: 12.77M eHMND from 436 accounts. Refunds pledged. Primary sources: https://blog.humanode.io/humanode-incident-response-and-recovery-update/ · https://x.com/humanode_io/status/2115542397413408974 · https://x.com/humanode_io/status/2115542405634302118</description></item><item><title>Fence Tranche Pool: Day-Rollover Accounting Reopened ~1.013M USDC Draw</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/fence-tranche-pool-rollover-draw</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/fence-tranche-pool-rollover-draw</guid><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit (developing)</category><category>Accounting</category><description>An Avalanche tranche pool tied to Fence lost ~1.013M USDC when a day-rollover accounting step reopened draw capacity. Per SlowMist, Defimon, Phalcon. Primary sources: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2115281126516490514 · https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2115328732181242351 · https://x.com/Phalcon_xyz/status/2115371832593563761 · https://x.com/CertiKAlert/status/2115289650025923015 · https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x3f6b23292a2e9c2956c7ac56d0b1f79b0271b49edec2156d2675ddf1de058c77</description></item><item><title>Udesk Support Script Injected: Session Theft and Deposit-Address Swaps</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/udesk-script-deposit-address-swap</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/udesk-script-deposit-address-swap</guid><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Malicious script injection (developing)</category><category>Supply chain</category><description>SlowMist: a Udesk customer-service script loaded code from udeskqlobal[.]com that steals sessions and logins and swaps crypto deposit addresses. Primary source: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2115033345675678012</description></item><item><title>predict.fun: ~400K USDT Drained; Third-Party API Docs Site Suspected</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/predict-fun-api-docs-wallet-drains</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/predict-fun-api-docs-wallet-drains</guid><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Wallet drains (developing)</category><category>Third-party access</category><description>predict.fun says ~400,000 USDT left a small number of user wallets; its third-party-hosted API docs site may have been compromised. Reimbursement pledged. Primary source: https://x.com/predictdotfun/status/2115089547528950108</description></item><item><title>wIRON on Base: Abnormal Bridge Issuance, 1:1 Backing Not Assured</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/wiron-base-chainport-abnormal-issuance</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/wiron-base-chainport-abnormal-issuance</guid><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Abnormal bridge issuance (developing)</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Iron Fish is investigating abnormal wIRON issuance on Base; on-chain, the ChainPort relayer minted 2.38B wIRON in one tx. 1:1 backing not assured. Primary sources: https://x.com/ironfishcrypto/status/2115282030946824307 · https://basescan.org/tx/0x8556ae35e3b99d0f9df139e4ac544b87550981c2064c1ae4b9442854accb1694 · https://basescan.org/token/0x166e70941262ae7cbf9df5c8897a6242c546457d</description></item><item><title>Glamsterdam: Fix Keeps Validator Deposits Out of Builder Balances</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/glamsterdam-gloas-builder-deposit-routing</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/glamsterdam-gloas-builder-deposit-routing</guid><pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Protocol spec fix (pre-mainnet)</category><category>Validation</category><description>Glamsterdam fix merged 26 Oct: at the Gloas fork, validator deposits sharing a key with a builder could be credited to the builder. Pre-mainnet. Primary sources: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/5736 · https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/issues/5735</description></item><item><title>Avalanche Safe: Unlimited Approvals to an Unclaimed Address, ~$7.45M Front-Run</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/avalanche-safe-unclaimed-approval-address</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/avalanche-safe-unclaimed-approval-address</guid><pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Approval exploit (MEV front-run)</category><category>Access control</category><description>A 2-of-7 Safe kept unlimited approvals to an address empty on Avalanche. An attacker claimed it; an MEV bot front-ran the ~$7.45M sweep. Per Defimon. Primary sources: https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2115005055619260758 · https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x6952f80bbbcad4368b020bcda600965cf0a520a8694db431b6b1521842d3829e · https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xf1f87d370290afe269ae8eb30fe8e5e4694ad153914a2de6d980641f4a331289 · https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xf88a7960a07832e1bf5be64edbd12a9e615b4f63959a4b87a147f0c63c007ed5</description></item><item><title>Yapeswap zero-quorum governance attack, per SlowMist</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/yapeswap-zero-quorum-governance</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/yapeswap-zero-quorum-governance</guid><pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Governance exploit</category><category>Governance</category><description>Per SlowMist, a zero-quorum Yapeswap proposal with ~0.000055% of voting power gave an attacker YapeFactory's fee role. Loss ~$21.9k. Primary sources: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2114290073546219799 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4c741568cc12b23b382db409b0a38a4cfb6c708904f0c2ce7bad2e4fa7179e1e · https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4527ca2d464aba06c96844a4842d3a79b49771c1964cd1333153a9a4c8dd8a39 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0xfe77b46a63b588748456f810129f6e89f2ab138d402ae0e2d64b29bb9880362e</description></item><item><title>DotSwap V1: Legacy Server-Side Signing Path Drained ~8.5 BTC</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/dotswap-v1-legacy-server-signing-drain</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/dotswap-v1-legacy-server-signing-drain</guid><pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Custodial pool drain (developing)</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>DotSwap V1's legacy server-side signing path was used to drain ~8.5 BTC (~$685K) from custodial V1 pools over ~4 hours on 25 Oct, per On Nexus. Primary source: https://x.com/swap_on_nexus/status/2114918342863868103</description></item><item><title>Polkadot Asset Hub: XCM Bug Desynced dotUSD Supply, Treasury LP Hit</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/polkadot-asset-hub-xcm-dotusd-supply</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/polkadot-asset-hub-xcm-dotusd-supply</guid><pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Chain-level bug (developing)</category><category>Bridge &amp; cross-chain</category><description>An XCM bug on Polkadot Asset Hub cut ~4.06M dotUSD from recorded supply; arbitrage cost the Treasury LP an est. $1.3M. Per Polkadot's forum notice. Primary sources: https://forum.polkadot.network/t/xcm-issue-affecting-asset-hub/19126 · https://x.com/PolkadotDevs/status/2114836882169512094</description></item><item><title>Electrum 4.8.3 fixes malicious-server transaction swap</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/electrum-malicious-server-rbf-swap</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/electrum-malicious-server-rbf-swap</guid><pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Wallet advisory</category><category>Validation</category><description>Electrum before 4.8.3 let a malicious server replace a just-broadcast transaction and trick users into fee-bumping a payment to the attacker. Update now. Primary sources: https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/security/advisories/GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v · https://x.com/ElectrumWallet/status/2113935057656369564 · https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/commit/90fe30822561e515a9d2d6e5a352cc07780999eb</description></item><item><title>X100 governance exploit: flash-loaned Senate seats</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/x100-flash-loan-senate-takeover</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/x100-flash-loan-senate-takeover</guid><pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Governance exploit (developing)</category><category>Governance</category><description>Per BlockSec Phalcon, flash-loaned X tokens took two of three X100 Senate seats on 24 Oct 2026 and forced a treasury dump. Est. loss $4.75M to $4.85M. Primary sources: https://x.com/Phalcon_xyz/status/2114020331925258732 · https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2114006384735916278 · https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2114011721300086877 · https://app.blocksec.com/phalcon/explorer/tx/eth/0x38c60844f1923d53fdce7d99e9bc2a2d8c73a08e793341dfbb479f8cc74d81d0</description></item><item><title>Initia halts chain after MoveVM minting incident</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/initia-movevm-minting-halt</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/initia-movevm-minting-halt</guid><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Chain halt (developing)</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Initia halted its L1 and rollups on 23 Oct 2026. A co-founder cites a MoveVM bug that allowed minting and about $2.7M bridged out. Root cause unpublished. Primary sources: https://x.com/initia/status/2113661738625155217 · https://x.com/ItsAlwaysZonny/status/2113667290059190466</description></item><item><title>WAX bridge exploit: negative fee made withdrawals free</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/wax-bridge-negative-fee-withdrawal</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/wax-bridge-negative-fee-withdrawal</guid><pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Bridge exploit</category><category>Bridge &amp; cross-chain</category><description>Per Blockaid, a WAX bridge withdraw action accepted a negative max_fee, so tokens left via Solana and Ethereum without being paid for on WAX. Fixed 23 Oct. Primary sources: https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2113247490950696982 · https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2113248378582683941 · https://x.com/WAX_io/status/2113390476225397077 · https://x.com/WAX_io/status/2113733701536551382 · https://waxblock.io/transaction/406b76e85ac057ac7322d4bf7ddbea6ac4a2b23539deaa00ea635d17518fb0c9</description></item><item><title>Fearless Wallet extension leaked keys since Feb 2025</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/fearless-wallet-extension-key-exfiltration</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/fearless-wallet-extension-key-exfiltration</guid><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Malicious wallet code</category><category>Supply chain</category><description>Polkadot says the third-party Fearless Wallet browser extension leaked private keys since Feb 2025. SlowMist names versions 3.0.1 and 3.0.3 to 3.0.5. Primary sources: https://x.com/Polkadot/status/2112910039207800970 · https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2113187562336706815</description></item><item><title>NemTokenV2 exploit: pool reserves burned, ~$820K out</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/nem-token-lp-burn-price-manipulation</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/nem-token-lp-burn-price-manipulation</guid><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>Per SlowMist, NemTokenV2 on BNB Chain counted transfers into its pool as sells; repeated transfer-skim-burn cycles inflated NEM and took ~$821,920. Primary sources: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2113206749524316486 · https://x.com/Phalcon_xyz/status/2113223739978707083 · https://bscscan.com/tx/0xfb093c96c0094cbcca10801f97ed2e5ed3d96550ce64b544df5a349545723f91</description></item><item><title>CoinDCX: 15.99M USDT Lost From Deprecated, Previously Compromised Wallets</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/coindcx-deprecated-wallet-sweep-failure</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/coindcx-deprecated-wallet-sweep-failure</guid><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange wallet loss</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>CoinDCX lost 15.99M USDT from deprecated wallets exposed in its July 2025 incident after a failed sweep let deposits pile up, per CoinDCX. Primary sources: https://coindcx.com/blog/coindcx-news/on-chain-wallet-activity-update-21-oct-2026 · https://x.com/CoinDCX/status/2114913942904660317</description></item><item><title>Slice exploit: fake slicer drained unclaimed earnings</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/slice-fundsmodule-fake-slicer</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/slice-fundsmodule-fake-slicer</guid><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>Slice says an exploiter took about $41k in unwithdrawn store earnings on 20 Oct 2026 via a legacy settlement function on Base. Contracts paused and fixed. Primary sources: https://x.com/slice__so/status/2112843976545796498 · https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2112804669865042308 · https://basescan.org/tx/0x02b039a6345348d984e4a0b70dd233127772206e61ce82c390c4709c0b8d790a</description></item><item><title>Keystone website breach exposes customer shipping data</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/keystone-website-breach-shipping-data</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/keystone-website-breach-shipping-data</guid><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Data breach</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Keystone says a third party obtained customer names, contacts, addresses and order details after unauthorized access to its website. No keys or seeds. Primary source: https://x.com/KeystoneWallet/status/2114054080754770137</description></item><item><title>Argent-style wallet exploit: recovery wrap and replay</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/argent-style-wallet-recovery-wrap-replay</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/argent-style-wallet-recovery-wrap-replay</guid><pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>Per SlowMist, an Argent-style wallet system let a recovery finalize at once and replayed one signed call up to 19 times; ~$59.8k lost on 19 Oct 2026. Primary sources: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2112157232624476254 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0xbfed8d33561ed5f9cbd0f4e62a5bbd20187a64f3e22180148dcb58ed6ebaa795 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa0ee8f914205a948c79eca039b7d8265537eb220472c9be1455d3321f1bd571b</description></item><item><title>rotki CVE-2026-116071: weak key for premium backups</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/rotki-premium-backup-weak-kdf</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/rotki-premium-backup-weak-kdf</guid><pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Software advisory</category><category>Cryptography</category><description>rotki before 1.44.2 keyed premium cloud backups with one unsalted SHA-256 of the password, exposing API keys to offline guessing if a backup leaked. Primary sources: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116071 · https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qgg8-6p8q-vrp7 · https://github.com/rotki/rotki/releases/tag/v1.44.2 · https://github.com/rotki/rotki/issues/13393</description></item><item><title>AlpsCon exploit via whitelisted Hardhat test key</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/alpscon-hardhat-default-key-whitelist</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/alpscon-hardhat-default-key-whitelist</guid><pubDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Access control</category><description>Per Defimon, AlpsCon's KYC whitelist on BNB Chain included Hardhat's public test account #0; an attacker used it on 18 Oct 2026 to net about $152K. Primary sources: https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2112102178026308045 · https://bscscan.com/tx/0x824b83f94bdc2e69b81f1cb2dfdf9d4aeed066114e3de29e3af59bd2d9355fc2 · https://bscscan.com/tx/0x29d790bfa04f3b989291f4e9b713cd9544735db5c6f2206166851fef5db11608 · https://bscscan.com/tx/0x6b0148ee33d63877b9c018e9f920152e1f3423539e61e7a08e45c6b4fd7e9178</description></item><item><title>NGRAVE LIQUID phishing via hijacked push notifications</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/ngrave-liquid-push-notification-phishing</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/ngrave-liquid-push-notification-phishing</guid><pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Phishing via third-party provider</category><category>Third-party access</category><description>Attackers hijacked NGRAVE LIQUID's push provider on 17 Oct 2026 and sent a fake alert that phished recovery phrases. About $2.56M traced, per NGRAVE. Primary source: https://www.ngrave.io/en/blog/incident-report-fake-liquid-security-alert-17-october</description></item><item><title>TIPMine attack on BNB Chain: TIP/SOL pool drained</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/tipmine-tip-pool-drain</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/tipmine-tip-pool-drain</guid><pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>TenArmor flagged a ~$68.5K attack on TIPMine on BNB Chain. On-chain, the TIP/SOL pool lost 715 SOL on 17 Oct 2026. Root cause: Unknown. Primary sources: https://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2111993166752866498 · https://bscscan.com/tx/0xa7b879b5d4252fa5b518db1f81be8a5cc670c5b978c7626fa287c0a1f37895a3</description></item><item><title>Qubic wallet drain: weak seed generation, 1,404 wallets</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/qubic-wallet-weak-seed-drain</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/qubic-wallet-weak-seed-drain</guid><pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Wallet exploit (developing)</category><category>Cryptography</category><description>Qubic says an attacker drained 1,404 wallets, about 2.94 trillion QU, on 17-18 Oct 2026 by exploiting weakly generated seeds. Recovery open. Developing. Primary sources: https://x.com/_Qubic_/status/2111796725677715474 · https://x.com/_Qubic_/status/2111796732598403507 · https://x.com/_Qubic_/status/2112608369135804801 · https://github.com/qubic/wallet/commit/09dd288c338c7ccfade043e840c53b80e795a916 · https://x.com/Phalcon_xyz/status/2112059239829242142 · https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2112471727209161180</description></item><item><title>Cysic bridge exploit: 10M CYS minted via fake message</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/cysic-bridge-fraudulent-mint-message</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/cysic-bridge-fraudulent-mint-message</guid><pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Bridge exploit</category><category>Bridge &amp; cross-chain</category><description>On 17 Oct 2026 an attacker minted 10M CYS on BNB Chain through Cysic's bridge after accessing a supporting database, per Cysic. Cysic suspended the bridge. Primary sources: https://x.com/cysic_fdn/status/2111761749116637687 · https://x.com/cysic_fdn/status/2112234119337848900</description></item><item><title>Kolan Uniswap V4 hook: buyback at manipulated price</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/kolan-hook-buyback-no-slippage-guard</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/kolan-hook-buyback-no-slippage-guard</guid><pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>Per Defimon, Kolan's Uniswap V4 hook bought back with no slippage limit when anyone closed a window; a flash-loan attacker netted ~1.28 ETH on 15 Oct 2026. Primary sources: https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2110776621087047818 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7b131926e6f06491ae1aead3e419b208c8aa70ed7898e8c5a33d9f52e40915a9</description></item><item><title>Pirate Chain counterfeit ARRR mint and rollback</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/pirate-chain-counterfeit-arrr-rollback</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/pirate-chain-counterfeit-arrr-rollback</guid><pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Chain-level exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>Two validation flaws let an attacker mint about 39.82M counterfeit ARRR on 14 Oct 2026. Pirate Chain v6.0.14 rolled the chain back to block 4,176,944. Primary sources: https://x.com/PirateChain/status/2113071437703532640 · https://x.com/PirateChain/status/2110774266123767871 · https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/releases/tag/v6.0.14-b14db80 · https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/blob/master/doc/release-notes/release-notes-6.0.14.md · https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/blob/master/doc/release-notes/release-notes-6.0.10.md</description></item><item><title>UNCX Vesting V2 exploit: share accounting root cause</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/uncx-vesting-v2-share-accounting</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/uncx-vesting-v2-share-accounting</guid><pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>UNCX Vesting V2 was drained on 14 Oct 2026 via stale share records reused on cancel. 11 transactions, 4 chains, about $807,609 per UNCX's report. Primary sources: https://uncx.network/vesting-incident · https://x.com/UNCX_token/status/2110506196339941423</description></item><item><title>Autheo THEO incident: IBC asset-validation flaw</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/autheo-ibc-asset-validation</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/autheo-ibc-asset-validation</guid><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Chain-level exploit</category><category>Bridge &amp; cross-chain</category><description>Autheo says an IBC asset-validation flaw let an attacker-run chain create ~219M unauthorized THEO on 12 Oct 2026. Mainnet remained halted as of 20 Oct. Primary source: https://www.autheo.com/blog/autheo-community-update-october-20-2026</description></item><item><title>BitBay vault drained via zero-liquidity withdraw</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/bitbay-vault-zero-liquidity-withdraw</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/bitbay-vault-zero-liquidity-withdraw</guid><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>Per SlowMist, a BitBay vault on Polygon paid its full balance when liquidity was zero; an attacker redeemed one share unit for ~14,838 DAI on 9 Oct 2026. Primary sources: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2108399198035202138 · https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x5b795dc5c5e1665b712c7ccf478c1d8c59a162d698f4e0bfb40bd303e04a7ff2</description></item><item><title>Ledger CryptoBilis implant: seed phrases sent over LTE</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/ledger-cryptobilis-implant</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/ledger-cryptobilis-implant</guid><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Hardware supply chain</category><category>Supply chain</category><description>Ledger confirmed a hidden implant in signers resold by CryptoBilis that captured recovery phrases at setup and sent them over LTE. Losses unconfirmed. Primary sources: https://x.com/Ledger/status/2109896739985453358 · https://www.ledger.com/blog-response-hardware-implant-attack · https://x.com/Ledger/status/2112478780576952759</description></item><item><title>EtherVista pair drained via K-invariant overflow</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/ethervista-pair-k-invariant-overflow</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/ethervista-pair-k-invariant-overflow</guid><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>Per SlowMist, EtherVistaPair.swap() multiplied uint112 reserves into an overflowing K check; two crafted swaps drained WETH and VISTA on 9 Oct 2026. Primary sources: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2108427455572918626 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0xb2c7332d9e1be6a86d9d37083aa4cc0d94b60eb95cc9b29494555a3c09764930</description></item><item><title>X7 Finance X7Pioneer drained via reward double count</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/x7-pioneer-claimrewards-double-count</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/x7-pioneer-claimrewards-double-count</guid><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>Per SlowMist, X7Pioneer's claimRewards() re-added the same unaccounted ETH on every empty call; an attacker took ~6.78 ETH on 8 Oct 2026. Primary sources: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2108142452888776907 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc98056d6ab55ef898189da5fa1fb08b968cb84ca99528d171f8240836b21766d</description></item><item><title>79thVault: operator role drained the 79AU/USDT pool</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/79thvault-operator-key-pool-drain</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/79thvault-operator-key-pool-drain</guid><pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Key compromise</category><category>Access control</category><description>Per Defimon, 79thVault's operator key moved 2.01M 79AU out of its PancakeSwap pool to an attacker on 7 Oct 2026, who sold it for ~$12.5M in BNB. Primary sources: https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2108100434942431441 · https://x.com/PeckShieldAlert/status/2108133701448327326 · https://bscscan.com/tx/0x18bc04788b034a1d8a09620770340977099cb4db7628e8931a5c4e625d37d0cc</description></item><item><title>Malicious hardhat-option and hardhat-promised npm packages</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/malicious-hardhat-npm-packages</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/malicious-hardhat-npm-packages</guid><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Malicious packages</category><category>Supply chain</category><description>Two npm packages aimed at Hardhat users, published 6-7 Oct 2026, run an obfuscated loader on import that targets browser-wallet storage. Remove them. Primary sources: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17660 · https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17662</description></item><item><title>Legacy MakerDAO auction keeper drained of 200 ETH</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/makerdao-legacy-auction-keeper-drain</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/makerdao-legacy-auction-keeper-drain</guid><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Access control</category><description>Per CertiK, an unauthenticated function on a 2020-era MakerDAO auction-keeper contract let an attacker take 200 ETH of unsettled collateral on 6 Oct 2026. Primary sources: https://www.certik.com/blog/makerdao-legacy-auction-keeper-incident-analysis · https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2107391959853600812 · https://etherscan.io/tx/0xbb6940f7c2a1e68cafbae7bb9b94d09af9af06ec3a114f6996f2cab993f3a88c</description></item><item><title>Vyper literal-shifting bugs via Unicode characters</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/vyper-unicode-literal-shifting</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/vyper-unicode-literal-shifting</guid><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Compiler advisory</category><category>Compiler</category><description>Two Vyper advisories (6 Oct 2026) show hidden or look-alike characters can make literals compile to different values in Vyper 0.4.1 through 0.5.0b1. Primary sources: https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-wvx7-39qj-2g9v · https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-r3c7-7xwm-6vfw</description></item><item><title>HAI governance attack: disguised treasury proposal</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/hai-malicious-governance-proposal</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/hai-malicious-governance-proposal</guid><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Governance attack (attempt)</category><category>Governance</category><description>Per Defimon, a 6 Oct 2026 HAI proposal labeled treasury maintenance would have delegated the treasury's KITE votes to its proposer. HAI says it failed. Primary sources: https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2107601752048435215 · https://x.com/letsgethai/status/2110446688045519086 · https://www.tally.xyz/gov/hai/proposal/945307170338596554802456536891275189748084619609113760500856562733210244266 · https://optimistic.etherscan.io/tx/0x48f51df912052658ea256a3c2ea893a66dee79a79b82b24383fc4f23da706aeb</description></item><item><title>@subql/common 5.8.3 npm compromise: CI artifact swap</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/subql-common-ci-artifact-swap</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/subql-common-ci-artifact-swap</guid><pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Package compromise</category><category>Supply chain</category><description>Malicious @subql/common 5.8.3 hit npm on 5 Oct 2026. A release step swapped the built package for an external tarball. Runs on install and import. Primary sources: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/subql-ecosystem-compromised · https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9333-3c4x-x3h5</description></item><item><title>Vyper optimizer bug: msg.value | K compiled to 1</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/vyper-optimizer-msg-value-or-k</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/vyper-optimizer-msg-value-or-k</guid><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Compiler advisory</category><category>Compiler</category><description>Vyper advisory GHSA-6j9c-gvcw-74fj: with default optimization, (msg.value | K) in a ternary branch compiles to 1. Affects 0.3.8 and later; no patch listed. Primary source: https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-6j9c-gvcw-74fj</description></item><item><title>FlashLoopAdapter exploit: self-vouching Safe module</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/flashloopadapter-self-vouching-safe-module</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/flashloopadapter-self-vouching-safe-module</guid><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Access control</category><description>On 1 Oct 2026 a fake Safe passed FlashLoopAdapter's isModuleEnabled check and drained two real Safes via a raw call. About $305K lost, per Defimon. Primary sources: https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2105695635647144370 · https://olympix.security/blog/flashloopadapters-305k-loss-and-how-olympix-would-have-prevented-it</description></item><item><title>NEAR Intents exploit: ghost deposits, $3.8M returned</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/near-intents-deposit-notification-ghost-balance</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/near-intents-deposit-notification-ghost-balance</guid><pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Bridge &amp; cross-chain</category><description>NEAR Intents says failed deposit notifications credited an attacker with $3.8M, withdrawn via BNB Chain from 29 Sep 2026. Funds returned in full 2 Oct. Primary sources: https://x.com/AlexAuroraDev/status/2111124226962870770 · https://x.com/near_intents/status/2105642219357241796 · https://x.com/ilblackdragon/status/2106072953570181155 · https://www.certik.com/blog/hot-bridge-near-intents · https://bscscan.com/tx/0x9fe58e031f73bbd880c782bc9e7446bcda32cadb304a729209871a4a81856c4c · https://bscscan.com/tx/0x16ddfa695b9525662b8e57c35723f44af89b4e7fc2dedc3634f730caf8b90c02</description></item><item><title>KelpDAO rsETH: Forged Bridge Packet Released 116,500 rsETH</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/kelpdao-rseth-bridge-dvn-2026</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/kelpdao-rseth-bridge-dvn-2026</guid><pubDate>Sat, 18 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Bridge verification compromise</category><category>Third-party access</category><description>KelpDAO: on 18 Apr 2026 a forged cross-chain packet accepted by third-party bridge verification released 116,500 rsETH from the Ethereum lockbox. Kelp says mainnet backing and the rsETH contract remain intact. Primary sources: https://blogs.kerneldao.com/blog/kelp-dao-%C2%B7-incident-response-%C2%B7-april-19-2026 · https://layerzero.network/blog/kelpdao-incident-statement</description></item><item><title>Drift Protocol: Durable-Nonce Multisig Approvals Used for Admin Takeover</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/drift-durable-nonce-admin-takeover-2026</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/drift-durable-nonce-admin-takeover-2026</guid><pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Governance / admin compromise</category><category>Access control</category><description>On 1 Apr 2026 Drift on Solana lost ~$285.3M after pre-signed durable-nonce approvals transferred Security Council admin control. Attacker then inflated fake collateral and withdrew real assets. Primary sources: https://x.com/DriftProtocol/status/2039564437795836039 · https://blocksec.com/blog/drift-protocol-incident-multisig-governance-compromise-via-durable-nonce-exploitation</description></item><item><title>Balancer V2: Exact-Out Rounding Drained Composable Stable Pools</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/balancer-csp-rounding-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/balancer-csp-rounding-2025</guid><pubDate>Mon, 03 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>Balancer: on 3 Nov 2025 incorrect rounding in the exact-out swap path of V2 Composable Stable Pools enabled a multi-chain drain. Balancer puts theft at $121.1M before recoveries; V3 unaffected. Primary source: https://medium.com/balancer-protocol/nov-3-exploit-post-mortem-51dcbeb6b020</description></item><item><title>SwissBorg SOL Earn: Kiln Connect API Injected Malicious Unstake Instructions</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/swissborg-kiln-sol-unstake-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/swissborg-kiln-sol-unstake-2025</guid><pubDate>Mon, 08 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Third-party staking API compromise</category><category>Supply chain</category><description>SwissBorg: on 8 Sep 2025 a Kiln Connect API compromise during an unstake changed withdrawal authority on &gt;150,000 SOL stakes. ~192,000 SOL affected. SwissBorg says its own custody was not breached. Primary sources: https://swissborg.com/blog/swissborg-security-update-kiln-breach · https://www.kiln.fi/post/re-enablement-of-kiln-services-and-security-incident-information</description></item><item><title>Bunni: Idle-Balance Rounding Across Tiny Withdrawals Enabled Sandwich</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/bunni-idle-balance-rounding-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/bunni-idle-balance-rounding-2025</guid><pubDate>Tue, 02 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>Bunni: on 2 Sep 2025 ~$8.4M was taken from weETH/ETH (Unichain) and USDC/USDT (Ethereum) via flash-loan swaps plus tiny withdrawals that skewed liquidity estimates. Primary source: http://blog.bunni.xyz/posts/exploit-post-mortem/</description></item><item><title>Odin.fun: Liquidity AMM Update Exploited for 58.2 BTC</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/odinfun-liquidity-amm-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/odinfun-liquidity-amm-2025</guid><pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Odin.fun: mid-Aug 2025 a vulnerability in its latest liquidity AMM update was exploited. Cofounder said 58.2 BTC lost; remaining platform funds safe; operations paused. Primary source: https://x.com/odin_fun</description></item><item><title>CrediX on Sonic: Admin Access Abuse, ~$4.5M, Reimbursement Pledged</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/credix-admin-sonic-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/credix-admin-sonic-2025</guid><pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Protocol admin compromise</category><category>Access control</category><description>CrediX: on 4 Aug 2025 acknowledged a security breach, disabled the website to stop new deposits, and pledged full recovery of user funds within 24–48 hours. Reports put the drain near $4.5M. Primary source: https://x.com/Credix_finance</description></item><item><title>WOO X: Dev-Machine Backdoor Led to $14M Unauthorized Withdrawals</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/woo-x-dev-backdoor-withdrawals-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/woo-x-dev-backdoor-withdrawals-2025</guid><pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange account compromise</category><category>Social engineering</category><description>WOO X: on 24 Jul 2025 a socially engineered backdoor on a developer MacBook let an attacker replace credentials for nine accounts and withdraw $14M. Users compensated from treasury; WOO attributes UNC4899/Lazarus. Primary source: https://woox.io/blog/july-24th-security-incident-post-mortem</description></item><item><title>BigONE: Third-Party Attack on Hot-Wallet Asset Transfers</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/bigone-hot-wallet-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/bigone-hot-wallet-2025</guid><pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange hot-wallet incident</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>BigONE: on 16 Jul 2025 it detected abnormal asset transfers, suspended deposits/withdrawals/trading, and said a third-party attack hit certain hot-wallet tokens. Private keys said secure; BigONE says it will fully cover losses. Primary sources: https://bigone.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/48906456010393-Announcement-Regarding-BigONE-Security-Incident-on-16-July-2025 · https://bigone.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/48916067512345-BigONE-Security-Incident-Disclosure-and-Progress-Update-July-16</description></item><item><title>Arcadia Finance: Unvalidated Rebalancer Calldata Drained Accounts</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/arcadia-rebalancer-calldata-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/arcadia-rebalancer-calldata-2025</guid><pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>Arcadia on Base: on 15 Jul 2025 unvalidated swap/calldata in the Rebalancer path let an attacker abuse trusted rebalancer permissions. ~$3.5–3.6M per security firms. Primary sources: https://www.certik.com/blog/arcadia-incident-analysis-arbitrary-swapdata · https://veridise.com/blog/audit-insights/low_level_call_hijacking_arcadia_exploit/</description></item><item><title>GMX V1 Arbitrum: OrderBook Reentrancy Inflated GLP, ~$40M Moved</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/gmx-v1-orderbook-reentrancy-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/gmx-v1-orderbook-reentrancy-2025</guid><pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Reentrancy</category><description>GMX: on 9 Jul 2025 a live V1 vulnerability on Arbitrum let ~$40M of GLP liquidity be withdrawn. Funds returned after outreach; $5M bounty paid. V2 unaffected. Primary source: https://gmxio.substack.com/p/glp-funds-on-arbitrum-fully-recovered</description></item><item><title>Nobitex: Unauthorized Access to Infrastructure and Hot Wallets</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/nobitex-hot-wallet-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/nobitex-hot-wallet-2025</guid><pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange hot-wallet incident</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Nobitex: in Jun 2025 it reported unauthorized access to part of its infrastructure and hot wallets, suspended access, and said most user assets were in cold storage. Gonjeshke Darande claimed responsibility. Primary source: https://nobitex.ir/mag/incident-statement-4/</description></item><item><title>ALEX Lab (Stacks): Self-Listing Helper Incident, 6 Jun 2025</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/alexlab-self-listing-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/alexlab-self-listing-2025</guid><pubDate>Fri, 06 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>ALEX: on 6 Jun 2025 a security incident hit its Stacks DEX pools (STX, sBTC, USDC, USDT and others). Stacks Foundation says the root cause was ALEX's application-level verification, not a Stacks protocol flaw. Primary source: https://stacks.foundation/june-6-alex-incident</description></item><item><title>Cork Protocol: Rollover Pricing and Hook Auth Bypass Drained 3,761 wstETH</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/cork-wsteth-weeth-vault-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/cork-wsteth-weeth-vault-2025</guid><pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Access control</category><description>Cork: on 28 May 2025 an attacker extracted 3,761 wstETH from the wstETH:weETH Liquidity Vault by combining rollover-price skew with a Cork Hook authorization bypass. All markets paused. Primary source: https://www.cork.tech/blog/post-mortem</description></item><item><title>Cetus CLMM: Faulty Overflow Check Let Add-Liquidity Drain Pools</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/cetus-clmm-overflow-check-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/cetus-clmm-overflow-check-2025</guid><pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>Cetus: on 22 May 2025 a flawed overflow check in an open-source library used by its CLMM let an attacker flash-swap, inject artificial liquidity, and drain pool reserves. Core pools disabled within minutes. Primary sources: https://cetusprotocol.notion.site/Cetus-Incident-Report-May-22-2025-Attack-Disclosure-1ff1dbf3ac8680d7a98de6158597d416 · https://www.sui.io/blog/cetus-incident-response-onchain-community-vote</description></item><item><title>Abracadabra: GM Cauldron Liquidation Left Phantom Collateral</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/abracadabra-gm-cauldrons-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/abracadabra-gm-cauldrons-2025</guid><pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>Abracadabra: on 25 Mar 2025 a GmxV2CauldronV4 liquidation path left orderValueInCollateral intact after collateral was pulled, letting an attacker mint ~13.4M undercollateralized MIM. User collateral unaffected. Primary source: https://paragraph.com/@abracadabra-money/post-mortem-attack-on-gm-cauldrons-25-03-25</description></item><item><title>Zoth: Admin Privilege Path and Unauthorized Proxy Upgrade</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/zoth-admin-proxy-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/zoth-admin-proxy-2025</guid><pubDate>Fri, 21 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Protocol admin compromise</category><category>Access control</category><description>Zoth: Mar–Apr 2025 security incidents included an admin-privilege path enabling unauthorized proxy upgrade and USD0++ drainage. Zoth published a 10 Apr security incident report. Primary source: https://medium.com/@zoth.io/security-incident-report-10th-april-2025-4dd9ed72e869</description></item><item><title>Infini: Security Compromise Affecting Neo-Bank Reserves</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/infini-admin-usdc-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/infini-admin-usdc-2025</guid><pubDate>Mon, 24 Feb 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Neobank / admin compromise</category><category>Access control</category><description>Infini: on 24 Feb 2025 acknowledged reports of a security compromise while saying transfers and payments remained operational. Analysts put USDC drained near $49–50M. Primary source: https://x.com/infini_so</description></item><item><title>Bybit: ETH Cold Wallet Drained via Spoofed Safe{Wallet} UI</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/bybit-eth-cold-wallet-safe-ui-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/bybit-eth-cold-wallet-safe-ui-2025</guid><pubDate>Fri, 21 Feb 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange cold-wallet compromise</category><category>Social engineering</category><description>Bybit: on 21 Feb 2025 a spoofed Safe{Wallet} UI let attackers change its ETH cold-wallet logic and move ~$1.46B. Other cold wallets unaffected; Bybit says client assets remain 1:1 backed. Primary source: https://www.bybit.com/en/learn/this-week-in-bybit/bybit-security-incident-timeline</description></item><item><title>zkLend: Empty wstETH Market Accumulator Manipulation on Starknet</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/zklend-empty-market-accumulator-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/zklend-empty-market-accumulator-2025</guid><pubDate>Tue, 11 Feb 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>zkLend: on 11 Feb 2025 an empty wstETH market was inflated via flash-loan donations, then floor-division withdrawals created excess collateral. ~$9.57M drained; markets suspended. Primary source: https://medium.com/zklend/zklend-security-incident-post-mortem-27d9abaf66f6</description></item><item><title>Phemex: Unusual Hot-Wallet Activity, Deposits and Withdrawals Suspended</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/phemex-hot-wallet-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/phemex-hot-wallet-2025</guid><pubDate>Thu, 23 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange hot-wallet incident</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Phemex: on 23 Jan 2025 at 11:30 UTC it detected unusual hot-wallet activity, suspended deposits and withdrawals, isolated devices, and reported to security firms and law enforcement. Withdrawals later restored by 26 Jan. Primary source: https://phemex.com/announcements/phemex-hot-wallet-security-incident-update-and-timeline</description></item><item><title>Radiant Capital: Compromised Devices Signed Malicious Safe Ownership Transfer</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/radiant-safe-malware-ownership-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/radiant-safe-malware-ownership-2024</guid><pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Protocol admin compromise</category><category>Social engineering</category><description>Radiant: on 16 Oct 2024 malware on at least three developers' devices collected Safe{Wallet} signatures that transferred LendingPool ownership. ~$50M drained from Arbitrum and BSC. Primary source: https://medium.com/@RadiantCapital/radiant-post-mortem-fecd6cd38081</description></item><item><title>BingX: Unauthorized Intrusion into One Hot Wallet</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/bingx-hot-wallet-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/bingx-hot-wallet-2024</guid><pubDate>Fri, 20 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange hot-wallet incident</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>BingX: at ~4:00 UTC+8 on 20 Sep 2024 it confirmed an incident affecting one hot wallet. System isolated; most funds said to be in unaffected cold wallets; $10M frozen in recovery efforts. Primary source: https://bingx.com/en/blog/article/ama-recap-with-bingx-cpo-vivien-lin-addressing-the-recent-hot-wallet-incident</description></item><item><title>Penpie: Missing Reentrancy Guard on batchHarvestMarketRewards</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/penpie-batch-harvest-reentrancy-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/penpie-batch-harvest-reentrancy-2024</guid><pubDate>Tue, 03 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Reentrancy</category><description>Penpie: on 3 Sep 2024 missing reentrancy protection in PendleStakingBaseUpg.batchHarvestMarketRewards let a malicious SY inflate rewards via flash-loaned assets during harvest. ~11,113.6 ETH (~$27.35M) reported lost. Primary sources: https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/penpie-incident-overview-and-request-for-compensation-suggestions/297 · https://blog.penpiexyz.io/penpie-post-mortem-report-1ac9863b663a</description></item><item><title>Ronin Bridge: Upgrade Misread Operator Threshold; ~$12M Whitehat Outflow</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/ronin-bridge-threshold-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/ronin-bridge-threshold-2024</guid><pubDate>Tue, 06 Aug 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Bridge configuration fault</category><category>Validation</category><description>Ronin: on 6 Aug 2024 a bridge upgrade misinterpreted the required operator vote threshold, allowing ~4,000 ETH plus ~$2M USDC outflows. Treated as whitehat; funds returned; $500k bounty offered. Primary source: https://x.com/Ronin_Network</description></item><item><title>WazirX: Multisig Payload Mismatch on Liminal Custody UI</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/wazirx-liminal-multisig-payload-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/wazirx-liminal-multisig-payload-2024</guid><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jul 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange custody compromise</category><category>Social engineering</category><description>WazirX: on 18 Jul 2024 a cyber attack on one Liminal-operated multisig wallet lost funds exceeding $230M. WazirX says the UI showed one transaction while a different payload was signed. Primary source: https://wazirx.com/blog/preliminary-report-cyber-attack-on-wazirx-multisig-wallet/</description></item><item><title>LI.FI: New Facet Missing Call Whitelist Drained Infinite Approvals</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/lifi-facet-arbitrary-call-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/lifi-facet-arbitrary-call-2024</guid><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jul 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>LI.FI: on 16 Jul 2024 a newly deployed facet lacked LibSwap call validation. Attackers drained ~$11.6M in USDC/USDT/DAI from 153 wallets with infinite approvals on Ethereum and Arbitrum. Primary source: https://li.fi/knowledge-hub/incident-report-16th-july</description></item><item><title>DMM Bitcoin: 4,502.9 BTC Unauthorized Outflow</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/dmm-bitcoin-4502-btc-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/dmm-bitcoin-4502-btc-2024</guid><pubDate>Fri, 31 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange wallet compromise</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>DMM Bitcoin: on 31 May 2024 it announced an unauthorized outflow of 4,502.9 BTC. FBI, DC3 and Japan's NPA later attributed the theft (~$308M) to DPRK actors tracked as TraderTraitor. Primary sources: https://bitcoin.dmm.com/news/20240531_01 · https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-dc3-and-npa-identification-of-north-korean-cyber-actors-tracked-as-tradertraitor-responsible-for-theft-of-308-million-from-bitcoindmmcom</description></item><item><title>Sonne Finance: Timelocked VELO Market Creation Enabled Donation Attack</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/sonne-velo-donation-attack-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/sonne-velo-donation-attack-2024</guid><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Accounting</category><description>Sonne: on Optimism an attacker executed timelocked VELO market-creation and collateral-factor txs, then used a known Compound v2 donation/precision attack for ~$20M. ~$6.5M saved by seeding VELO. Primary source: https://medium.com/@SonneFinance/post-mortem-sonne-finance-exploit-12f3daa82b06</description></item><item><title>Hedgey ClaimCampaigns: Create-and-Cancel Left Token Allowances Open</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/hedgey-claimcampaigns-allowance-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/hedgey-claimcampaigns-allowance-2024</guid><pubDate>Fri, 19 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Access control</category><description>Hedgey: on 19 Apr 2024 ClaimCampaigns.sol let an attacker create a locked campaign approving a malicious locker, cancel without revoking allowance, then drain. ~$45M notional across chains. Primary source: https://medium.com/hedgey/hedgey-exploit-post-mortem-784e9860fd8d</description></item><item><title>Prisma Finance: MigrateTroveZap Flashloan Path Skimmed Trove Collateral</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/prisma-migrate-trove-zap-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/prisma-migrate-trove-zap-2024</guid><pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>Prisma: on 28 Mar 2024 insufficient validation in MigrateTroveZap.onFlashloan let attackers close and reopen Troves with less collateral. ~3,479 ETH (~$12M) taken; protocol paused. Primary source: https://hackmd.io/@PrismaRisk/PostMortem0328</description></item><item><title>Seneca Chamber: performOperations Allowed Arbitrary transferFrom</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/seneca-chamber-performoperations-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/seneca-chamber-performoperations-2024</guid><pubDate>Wed, 28 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Access control</category><description>Seneca: on 28 Feb 2024 Chamber.performOperations let an attacker call transferFrom using users' excessive approvals. $6.4M stolen; ~$5.3M recovered via whitehat, ~$1.04M kept as bounty. Primary source: https://paragraph.com/@seneca-protocol/seneca-exploit-post-mortem</description></item><item><title>FixedFloat: Hosting Compromise, $26.1M Then a Second Intrusion</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/fixedfloat-hosting-compromise-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/fixedfloat-hosting-compromise-2024</guid><pubDate>Fri, 16 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange infrastructure compromise</category><category>Third-party access</category><description>FixedFloat: in February 2024 an attacker exploited its security structure and stole $26.1M. FixedFloat later says the same actor returned via Time4VPS hosting on 31 Mar. Service later resumed. Primary source: https://ff.io/blog/news/reasons-for-hacking</description></item><item><title>Orbit Bridge: ~$81.5M Taken from Ethereum Vault</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/orbit-bridge-ethereum-vault-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/orbit-bridge-ethereum-vault-2024</guid><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Bridge exploit</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Ozys (Orbit Bridge): between 5:52 and 6:25 a.m. KST on 1 Jan 2024 an attacker took ~$81.5M in ETH, WBTC, USDT, USDC and DAI from the Ethereum vault. Ozys says not a contract bug or stolen validator key. Primary source: https://medium.com/orbit-chain/official-statement-regarding-orbit-bridge-exploit-551928f3dc52</description></item><item><title>Ledger Connect Kit: Phished NPM Account Published Malicious Packages</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/ledger-connect-kit-npm-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/ledger-connect-kit-npm-2023</guid><pubDate>Thu, 14 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Supply-chain compromise</category><category>Supply chain</category><description>Ledger: on 14 Dec 2023 a phished former employee NPM account published malicious Connect Kit versions 1.1.5–1.1.7 that could reroute dApp transactions. Fix within ~40 minutes; hardware and Ledger Live unaffected. Primary sources: https://www.ledger.com/blog/security-incident-report · https://www.ledger.com/blog/a-letter-from-ledger-chairman-ceo-pascal-gauthier-regarding-ledger-connect-kit-exploit</description></item><item><title>HTX: Hot Wallet Attack; Exchange Says It Will Fully Compensate</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/htx-hot-wallet-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/htx-hot-wallet-2023</guid><pubDate>Wed, 22 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange hot-wallet incident</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>HTX: on 22 Nov 2023 it confirmed a hot-wallet attack on HTX and the Heco bridge path. Justin Sun said HTX would fully compensate; deposits and withdrawals temporarily suspended. Primary sources: https://www.htx.com/zh-cn/support/104954980569005/ · https://www.htx.com/zh-cn/support/24955033595175/</description></item><item><title>Poloniex: November 2023 Hot-Wallet Incident; Full Reimbursement Pledged</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/poloniex-hot-wallet-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/poloniex-hot-wallet-2023</guid><pubDate>Fri, 10 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange hot-wallet incident</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Poloniex: around 10 Nov 2023 a hot-wallet incident drained exchange wallets. Justin Sun said Poloniex was financially healthy and would fully reimburse; some stolen assets were reported frozen. Primary source: https://www.poloniex.com/announcement/18976674677911</description></item><item><title>Mixin Network: Cloud Provider Database Attack, ~$200M Mainnet Assets</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/mixin-cloud-database-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/mixin-cloud-database-2023</guid><pubDate>Sat, 23 Sep 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Custodial infrastructure compromise</category><category>Third-party access</category><description>Mixin Kernel: early 23 Sep 2023 HKT, its cloud service provider's database was attacked, with loss of some mainnet assets (~US$200M). Deposits and withdrawals suspended. Primary source: https://x.com/MixinKernel/status/1706139175018529139</description></item><item><title>CoinEx: Hot-Wallet Private Key Leak, Multi-Chain Outflows</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/coinex-hot-wallet-key-leak-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/coinex-hot-wallet-key-leak-2023</guid><pubDate>Tue, 12 Sep 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange hot-wallet compromise</category><category>Key compromise</category><description>CoinEx: on 12 Sep 2023 anomalous hot-wallet withdrawals were detected. Cause preliminarily determined as hot-wallet private key leakage. Cold wallets unaffected; foundation bears losses. Primary source: https://www.coinex.com/en/announcements/detail/19187420867348</description></item><item><title>Stake.com: Hot-Wallet Theft Attributed by FBI to Lazarus ($41M)</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/stake-com-lazarus-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/stake-com-lazarus-2023</guid><pubDate>Mon, 04 Sep 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange hot-wallet compromise</category><category>Social engineering</category><description>FBI: Lazarus Group stole $41 million from Stake.com. Stake said unauthorized ETH/BSC hot-wallet transactions were contained and operations resumed; user funds said safe. Primary sources: https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-identifies-lazarus-group-cyber-actors-as-responsible-for-theft-of-41-million-from-stakecom · https://medium.com/@edcraven22/always-moving-forward-reflections-on-the-recent-stake-com-exploit-431105710a2e</description></item><item><title>Curve: Vyper 0.2.15 Reentrancy Lock Failure Hit Several Pools</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/curve-vyper-reentrancy-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/curve-vyper-reentrancy-2023</guid><pubDate>Sun, 30 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Compiler / smart-contract exploit</category><category>Reentrancy</category><description>Curve: on 30 Jul 2023 several pools compiled with Vyper 0.2.15 were exploited after a malfunctioning reentrancy lock. Curve said other pools were safe. Primary source: https://x.com/CurveFinance</description></item><item><title>Multichain: MPC Address Assets Moved Abnormally; Bridges Halted</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/multichain-mpc-abnormal-move-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/multichain-mpc-abnormal-move-2023</guid><pubDate>Thu, 06 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Bridge / MPC compromise</category><category>Key compromise</category><description>Multichain: early Jul 2023 assets locked in its MPC address were moved to an unknown address abnormally. Users told to stop using services and revoke approvals. PeckShield ~$126M. Primary source: https://x.com/MultichainOrg</description></item><item><title>Atomic Wallet: June 2023 Client Compromise Event</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/atomic-wallet-june-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/atomic-wallet-june-2023</guid><pubDate>Sat, 03 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Wallet client compromise</category><category>Not yet published</category><description>Atomic Wallet: early Jun 2023 a subset of users lost funds. Atomic said less than 0.1% of users were affected and listed possible causes without confirming a single root cause. Primary source: https://atomicwallet.io/blog</description></item><item><title>Euler V1: Missing Health Check on donateToReserves Enabled Self-Liquidation</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/euler-donate-to-reserves-2023</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/euler-donate-to-reserves-2023</guid><pubDate>Mon, 13 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Smart-contract exploit</category><category>Validation</category><description>Euler: on 13 Mar 2023 ~$197M was taken via a missing health check on donateToReserves. After weeks of negotiation, ~$240M was returned. Primary source: https://www.euler.finance/blog/war-peace-behind-the-scenes-of-eulers-240m-exploit-recovery</description></item><item><title>FTX / Alameda: November 2022 Exchange Collapse and Bankruptcy</title><link>https://andromeda.observer/e/ftx-alameda-collapse-2022</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://andromeda.observer/e/ftx-alameda-collapse-2022</guid><pubDate>Fri, 11 Nov 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Exchange insolvency</category><category>Custody failure</category><description>FTX: on 11 Nov 2022 FTX Trading Ltd. and affiliates filed for Chapter 11. Customer withdrawals had halted days earlier amid Alameda solvency revelations. Not a smart-contract exploit; custodial failure. Primary sources: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022-219 · https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/united-states-attorney-announces-charges-against-ftx-founder-samuel-bankman-fried</description></item>
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