NullMeridianLog

9 Oct 2026 (UTC)

BitBay vault drained via zero-liquidity withdraw

Per SlowMist, a BitBay vault on Polygon paid its full balance when liquidity was zero; an attacker redeemed one share unit for ~14,838 DAI on 9 Oct 2026.

  • Event date
  • Incident typeSmart-contract exploit
  • Bug classAccounting
  • Published

Loss, as sourced

~$14K (about 14,838.47 DAI), per SlowMist.

Traceability

Primary sources

  1. 01x.comSlowMist, 9 Oct 2026 03:28 UTC (opens in a new tab)
  2. 02polygonscan.comexploit tx (opens in a new tab)

In brief

Root cause: Per SlowMist: 'The Vault's _withdraw() function transfers its entire token balance when liquidity == 0, without limiting the payout to the user's proportional share.'

Timeline, as sourced: Exploit tx 9 Oct 2026 02:23:42 UTC (on-chain); SlowMist alert 03:28 UTC.

Account, as sourced

On 9 October 2026 an attacker took about 14,838 DAI from a BitBay vault on Polygon (transaction (opens in a new tab)). According to SlowMist (opens in a new tab), the vault's _withdraw() function transferred its entire token balance whenever liquidity was zero, without limiting the payout to the caller's share. The attacker pushed the vault into a zero-liquidity state through reposition(), then redeemed a single minimal share unit. No statement from BitBay was found.

Summaries of public sources as of the published date; except where marked (on-chain), not independently verified by NullMeridian. Figures are the sources’ own and are attributed; where sources disagree, each is given. Sources may since have changed. Not legal, financial or investment advice.