HAI governance attack: disguised treasury proposal

None. Per Defimon, '~$927K at risk' and 'no funds have moved yet'; per HAI, the proposal failed to gain the necessary votes.

Root cause: Per Defimon: a proposal whose description did not match its calldata; the concealed action was delegate() to the proposer, which would have handed it about 34% of voting power against a 1% (9,739 KITE) quorum.

Timeline, as sourced: Proposal submitted 6 Oct 2026 09:17:51 UTC (on-chain); Defimon alert 6 Oct 22:38 UTC; HAI update 14 Oct 19:04 UTC.

On 6 October 2026 a newly funded address submitted a proposal to HAI's governor on Optimism titled 'Quarterly Treasury Maintenance: Refill Rewards and Renew Approvals' (proposal (opens in a new tab), transaction (opens in a new tab)). According to Defimon (opens in a new tab), five of its six actions were routine, while the sixth, labeled as delegating treasury KITE voting power, called delegate() with the proposer's own address. Defimon says that would have pointed the treasury Safe's 328,143 KITE, about 34% of supply, at the proposer against a 1% quorum, and that no funds had moved. On 14 October HAI said (opens in a new tab) the proposal failed to gain the necessary votes and that the same actor then submitted 1,000 more proposals, which it expects will not pass either. A proposal's calldata, not its description, is what executes.